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District of Columbia v. Heller: The Second
Amendment Shoots One Down
"A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not
be infringed."'
I. INTRODUCTION
District of Columbia v. Heller2 decided the constitutionality of
a series of Washington, D.C., statutes that prohibited the
registration of handguns and required that all lawfully registered
firearms be kept disassembled or secured with a trigger lock unless
the firearm was kept in a place of business or was being used for
lawful recreational purposes.3 In determining whether this statute
was constitutional, the United States Supreme Court addressed the
meaning of the Second Amendment for the first time in more than
half a century, finding 4that the Amendment protects an individual's
right to self-defense. As a result, the Court struck down the
District of Columbia statutes as an unconstitutional infringement of
an individual's Second Amendment rights.
5
Because so few cases have involved violations of the Second
Amendment, the Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to
explore its meaning. As a result, Heller represented the Court's
first extensive interpretation of the Second Amendment. Despite
the detailed interpretation that it provides, the Court left many
questions unanswered. The most important of these questions
considers what impact the individual right interpretation of the
Second Amendment will have on state and federal gun regulations.
This Note analyzes one issue that Heller left unresolved,
namely the standard of review to be used by courts in determining
the constitutionality of gun regulations. In the wake of Heller, this
Note argues that courts should use a balancing test that weighs the
interest of the government in public safety against an individual
right to keep and bear arms as guaranteed by the Second
Amendment. To reach this end, Part II of this Note discusses the
development of Second Amendment interpretation in federal
jurisprudence, particularly emphasizing the collective rights
interpretation of the Second Amendment endorsed by federal
Copyright 2010, by SARAH PERKINS.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
2. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
3. Id. at 2788; D.C. CODE § 7-2507.02 (2001).
4. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2799.
5. Id. at 2818.
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courts until the early twenty-first century. Part III examines the
holdings of the majority opinion and the key issues raised by the
dissenting opinions. Part IV explains what level of scrutiny courts
should use to determine the constitutionality of state and federal
gun regulations. Part V analyzes a variety of federal, state, and
local regulations to predict whether they should survive the new
level of scrutiny mandated by Heller. Part VI offers a brief
conclusion.
II. FEDERAL PRECEDENT AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT
The Second Amendment has rarely surfaced in litigation before
the Supreme Court. In fact, the Court has only significantly
addressed the meaning of the Second Amendment in three cases
prior to its decision in Heller. In none of these cases did the Court
extensively address the nature of the right protected by the Second
Amendment. The earliest of the Supreme Court cases, United
States v. Cruikshank,6 arose from a conspiracy indictment brought
against several white defendants under the 1870 Enforcement Act.
7
The second count of the indictment accused the defendants of
having the intent to "hinder and prevent [two African-American
men from exercising] the 'right to keep and bear arms for a lawful
purpose.' ' 8 The Court provided little guidance on the meaning of
the Second Amendment. Addressing the defendants' appeal of
their conviction, the Court found that "bearing arms for a lawful
purpose" was neither created by the Constitution nor dependent
upon the Constitution for its existence. 9 Despite this reference to
the right to keep and bear arms, the Court also reflected the
common legal view of the time that the Bill of Rights was only
applicable to the federal government: "The [S]econd [A]mendment
declares that it shall not be infringed; but this, as has been seen,
means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress. This
is one of the amendments that has no other effect than to restrict
the powers of the national government."
10
The next case to address the meaning of the Second
Amendment was Presser v. State of Illinois." Presser was
convicted of violating a section of the Illinois Military Code that
forbade "any body of men whatever, other than the regular
6. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
7. Id. at 545.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 553.
10. Id.
11. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
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organized volunteer militia of this state, and the troops of the
United States, to associate themselves together as a military
company or organization, or to drill or parade with arms in any city
or town of this state, without the license of the governor thereof.""
The petitioner challenged his conviction as a violation of the
Second Amendment. 13 However, the Court found that this section
of the Illinois Military Code did not violate the Second
Amendment because it did not prevent qualified people from
serving in either the United States or state militias. 14 Furthermore,
the Court continued to adhere to the proposition that the Second
Amendment was applicable only to the federal government and not
the states.'
5
The most recent Supreme Court interpretation of the Second
Amendment prior to Heller was United States v. Miller.16 The
defendant in Miller had been convicted of violating the National
Firearms Act by transporting a shotgun with a barrel measuring
less than eighteen inches in length across state lines. 17 The Court
found that the provision of the National Firearms Act in question
did not violate the Second Amendment as it did not interfere with
the maintenance of the militia.18 Because the weapons prohibited
by the federal provision did not have a "reasonable relationship" to
the maintenance of a militia, the Court held that the Second
Amendment did not protect the defendant's right to possess the
shotgun at issue. 19 Like the other Supreme Court jurisprudence,
Miller focused almost exclusively on the relationship between the
Second Amendment and the militia, developing a definition for the
term "militia" as determined by sources produced at the time of the
drafting and ratification of the Second Amendment.
20
While the Supreme Court remained silent on the issue for
roughly seventy years after Miller, legal scholars continued to
debate the nature of the right protected by the Second Amendment
during the twentieth century. Two basic theories about the nature
of the right-the collective rights theory and the individual right
12. Id. at 253.
13. Id. at 264-65.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
17. Id. at 175; 26 U.S.C § 1132 (1934).
18. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 178-82.
21. See generally Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second
Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461 (1995) (noting the increase in Second
Amendment scholarship associated with the growing importance of the political
gun control debate in the late twentieth century).
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theory-emerged from this lively academic debate.22  The
collective rights theory claims that the Second Amendment
protects the right of the states to maintain a militia without federal
interference.23 This theory adopts a narrow definition of militia,
"which includes only current members of the National Guard,
Army Reserve Corps[], and other government sponsored military
forces."24 Because of this interpretation, many collective rights
theorists believe that the Second Amendment has become
anachronistic and is no longer applicable to modem society.25 On
the other hand, the individual right theory claims that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms.
26
Proponents of this theory believe that this right is protected from
infringement by either the federal or state government.27 The
individual right theory has continued to attract legal scholars
throughout the late twentieth century.
28
While scholars argued over the nature of the Second
Amendment, litigation on this issue continued in federal district
and appellate courts. 2 9 In United States v. Emerson, a Texas state
court issued several restraining orders against Emerson after he
was engaged in a domestic dispute with his ex-wife's lover.30 A
few months later, Emerson was indicted for violating a federal
firearm provision that prohibited a person subject to a restraining
order from possessing a firearm "in and affecting interstate
22. Anthony Gallia, Comment, "Your Weapons, You Will Not Need Them. "
Comment on the Supreme Court's Sixty-Year Silence on the Right to Keep and
Bear Arms, 33 AKRON L. REV. 131, 135-46 (1999).
23. Robert Harman, Note and Comment, The People's Right to Bear
Arms-What the Second Amendment Protects: An Analysis of the Current
Debate Regarding What the Second Amendment Really Protects, 18 WHITrIER
L. REV. 411,415 (1997).
24. Id. at 414-15.
25. See Gallia, supra note 22, at 144; Harman, supra note 23, at 414;
Andrea Moates, Note, Second Amendment Jurisprudence: The Possible
Destruction of the Rights of "The People," 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 363, 392(2005).
26. Harman, supra note 23, at 413.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Carl T. Bogus, The History and Politics of Second Amendment
Scholarship: A Primer, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 12-13 (2000); Sanford
Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989);
Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right to Self-
Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REV. 103 (1987); William Van Alstyne, The Second
Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DuKE L.J. 1236 (1994).
29. See United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265 (1lth Cir. 1997); United
States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d
1016 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1977);
Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942).
30. 270 F.3d 203, 211 (5th Cir. 2001).
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commerce." 31 Emerson challenged the constitutionality of this
federal firearm provision, claiming that it violated his Second
Amendment rights.32
In determining the constitutionality of the federal firearm
provision at issue, the Fifth Circuit provided its own interpretation
of the Second Amendment. The court first analyzed Miller, the
most recent (at the time) Supreme Court precedent on the Second
Amendment. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that Miller was likely
decided on the premise that the shotgun at issue was not
considered part of the class of arms protected by the Second
Amendment.33 Furthermore, the court found that Miller should not
be limited to protecting arms within the militia context because the
opinion failed to mention whether the defendants were members of
a militia.34 In light of this liberal reading of Supreme Court Second
Amendment precedent and its own statutory and historical
interpretations, the Fifth Circuit found that the Second Amendment
protects an individual right to bear arms.35 It defined this
individual right as the right to possess firearms that can be used as
personal weapons and that are not otherwise prohibited by the
jurisprudential test established in Miller.36
The Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the Second Amendment as
protecting an individual right to possess arms marked the first time
that a federal appellate court adopted such a position.3 7 In fact, the
Emerson court recognized the revolutionary nature of its holding,
acknowledging that no other federal circuit had endorsed this
interpretation of the Second Amendment. 38 However, the court
also found that such an individual right is subject to reasonable
regulations. 39 As examples of such reasonable regulations, the
Fifth Circuit provided the prohibition of firearm possession by
"felons, infants and those of unsound mind. ' 4° In this context, the
court upheld the federal firearm provision at issue as constitutional,
finding its prohibition of firearm possession by a person
31. Id. at 211-12; see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2000).
32. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 212.
33. Id. at 224.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 260.
36. Id.
37. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2823 n.3 (2008)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
38. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 220.
39. Id. at 261.
40. Id.
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considered a threat to a domestic partner to be a reasonable
regulation.4'
Shortly after Emerson, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft
endorsed the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the Second
Amendment in a memorandum to all United States Attorneys.42
The Attorney General approved both the restriction on the
defendant's right to possess a firearm imposed by the federal
firearm provision at issue and the individual right interpretation of
the Second Amendment. 43 In addition, then-Attorney General
Ashcroft stressed that the federal government would continue to
maintain a balance between the enforcement of federal laws and
the individual right to bear arms guaranteed by the Second
Amendment.44
III. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER
A. Facts and Procedural Background
The Supreme Court issued its much anticipated decision in
Heller on June 26, 2008.45 The main question presented in Heller
was the constitutionality of a series of District of Columbia gun
regulations that the Supreme Court characterized as effectively
preventing the "possession of usable handguns in the home., 46 One
District of Columbia statute required that all firearms be registered
but imposed a blanket prohibition on the registration of
handguns.47 Despite this prohibition on the registration of
handguns, a District of Columbia resident was permitted to carry a
handgun if he had been issued a license to do so from the District
of Columbia chief of police.48 Furthermore, another statute
required that any lawfully owned firearm be kept disassembled or
bound by a trigger lock unless the firearm was kept in a place of
business or used for lawful recreational purposes.49
Heller was a special police officer authorized to carry a
handgun while serving on duty at the Federal Judicial Center in
41. Id. at 263.
42. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, United States Attorney General, on
United States v. Emerson to United States Attorneys (Nov. 9, 2001).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
46. Id. at 2787-88.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 2788.
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Washington, D.C.50 After being denied a registration certificate for
a handgun that he wanted to keep at home, Heller was one of
several plaintiffs to challenge the District of Columbia gun
regulations in Parker v. District of Columbia.51 The federal district
court initially denied injunctive relief to Heller because it did not
recognize an individual right to keep and bear arms outside of the
context of a militia.52 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia53 reversed the district court and held that the
Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear
firearms, that the general prohibition on handguns in the District of
Columbia statutes at issue was unconstitutional, and that the
requirement that firearms used for self-defense in the home be kept
essentially non-functional was also unconstitutional.54
B. Majority Opinion by Justice Scalia
In Heller, the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment
protects an individual right to possess firearms.55 Writing for the
majority,56 Justice Scalia simply stated, "There seems to us no
doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that the Second
Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear
arms. ' 57 To reach this holding, the majority engaged in a detailed
analysis of the text, historical background, and legal precedent of
the Second Amendment.
Beginning his analysis with the text of the Second Amendment,
Justice Scalia divided the Second Amendment into two basic
parts-the operative clause and the prefatory clause.58 Under this
classification, the operative clause consisted of the phrase "right of
the people to keep and bear arms," and the prefatory clause
consisted of the phrase "well-reulated Militia being necessary for
the security of a free state."5  After addressing the individual
elements of the operative clause, Justice Scalia found that the
overall purpose of the clause was to guarantee an "individual right
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Parker v. District of Columbia, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103 (D.D.C. 2004),
rev'd, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
53. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
54. Id.
55. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2799.
56. Justice Scalia was joined in his majority opinion by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. Id. at 2787.
57. Id. at 2799.
58. Id. at 2789.
59. Id.
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to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation." 60 The
majority also used history to support this interpretation of the
operative clause, citing the importance of arms to the British in
times of political upheaval and to the American colonists' own
experience with political oppression by the British.6'
The majority then addressed the meaning of the prefatory
clause. The Court accepted the definition of the term "militia"
from Miller as "all males physically capable of acting in concert
for the common defense." ' 2 Meanwhile, the majority interpreted
the phrase "free state" to refer to a free polity rather than individual
states.63 While this interpretation of the prefatory clause
emphasizes the need to preserve the militia, the Court found that it
does not limit the scope of the operative clause; in other words, the
right to a militia is not the only right guaranteed by the Second
Amendment.
64
After addressing various historical interpretations of the
Second Amendment, the Court then discussed its interoretation of
the Second Amendment in light of its own precedent. Although
Cruikshank engaged in only a limited discussion of the Second
Amendment,66 the case seemed to imply that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right because it did not discuss
whether the alleged victims in the case were deprived of their right
to keep and bear arms within the context of a militia.67 The Court
also found that Presser 8 did not prevent an individual right
interpretation of the Second Amendment. 69 This interpretation of
the Second Amendment would still allow the states to prohibit
private military organizations such as the one at issue in Presser.
70
The majority then noted that Miller failed to discuss the scope of
the Second Amendment.7 ' Rather, Miller involved the scope of
weapons protected under the Second Amendment-not the nature
of the protected right.72 In conclusion, the Court found that its own
60. Id. at 2797.
61. Id. at 2797-99.
62. Id. at 2799-800.
63. Id. at 2800.
64. Id. at 2801-02.
65. Id. at 2812-16.
66. Cruikshank v. United States, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
67. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2812-13.
68. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
69. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2813.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2814.
72. Id.
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precedent did not prevent the individual right interpretation of the
Second Amendment endorsed in Heller.
73
Though the majority held that the Second Amendment protects
an individual right to bear arms, the Heller Court also stated that
the government can limit this right.74 In fact, the Court specifically
found that most traditional prohibitions on firearm possession
should be upheld; such prohibitions include firearm possession by
felons or mentally ill persons and "in sensitive places such as
schools and government buildings .... ,75 It also discussed other
possible limitations on the right to keep and bear arms, including
the type of arms protected by the Second Amendment.
Furthermore, the Court held that the Second Amendment only
protects an individual right to keep and bear arms that were "in
common use at the time" the Second Amendment was drafted.77
After examining the nature and the scope of the Second
Amendment, the Court applied its interpretation of the Second
Amendment to the District of Columbia statutes at issue.78 First,
the majority found the statute establishing an absolute prohibition
on handguns to be unconstitutional because it violated the inherent
right of self-defense protected by the Second Amendment. 79 The
Court provided two main reasons for the statute's
unconstitutionality: one, the fact that handguns are the most
popular means of self-defense in America, 80 and two, because the
prohibition significantly affects the home, the place where people
are most likely to defend themselves and their property.
8 1
The majority also found that this statute would be
unconstitutional under any level of constitutional scrutiny. While
specifically avoiding the question of how gun regulations like the
District of Columbia statute should be tested for constitutionality,
the Heller Court did emphasize that rationality review would be an
inappropriate level of scrutiny to evaluate a statute that restricts an
enumerated constitutional right, opining that the application of
such a low level of review to alleged violations of the Second
Amendment would render the Second Amendment essentially
73. Id. at 2816.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2816-17. The Court found that this list of permissible restrictions
was not intended to be exhaustive. Id. at 2817 n.26.
76. Id. at2817.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2817-22.
79. Id. at2817.
80. Id. at 2818.
81. Id. at 2817.
82. Id. at 2817-18.
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useless.83 Finally, the Court found the statute requiring that
firears within the home be kept inoperable to be unconstitutional
because that requirement made it "impossible" for an individual to
exercise the core ri 0t protected by the Second Amendment-the
right of self-defense.
C. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Stevens
In the first dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens 85 found that the
Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear
arms for military purposes but does not prevent a legislature from
restricting an individual's nonmilitary use of arms. 6 Like the
majority, the Stevens dissent engaged in a textual and historical
analysis of the Second Amendment to support its interpretation.
Justice Stevens divided the Second Amendment into three basic
parts: an introduction, which explains the purpose of the Second
Amendment; the class of persons who enjoy the right provided by
the Second Amendment; and the essence of the right.s According
to his textual analysis, the introductory phrase "[a] well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State" clearly
states that the purpose of the Second Amendment is the
preservation of the militia.88 Unlike the majority, Justice Stevens
found the phrase "the people" to be collective in nature and to refer
to the militia.8 9 Furthermore, the collective nature of "the people"
is emphasized by its use in other amendments, such as the First
Amendment. 90 Finally, the Stevens dissent defined the phrase "to
keep and bear arms" as the "right to use and possess arms in
conjunction with service in a well-regulated militia."91 Justice
Stevens engaged in an extensive linguistic analysis to arrive at this
definition. First, he found that the phrase "to bear arms" is most
often used in a military context; then, he found that the phrase "to
keep arms" is used in many contemporary militia statutes to refer
to the common practice of having militia members store arms in
their homes to be ready for military action on short notice. 92
83. Id. at 2818 n.27.
84. Id. at 2818.
85. Justice Stevens was joined in his dissenting opinion by Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id. at 2822.
86. Id. at 2823 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 2824.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2827.
90. Id.
91. Id. at2831.
92. Id. at 2828, 2830.
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After engaging in a textual analysis, Justice Stevens discussed
the historical background of the Second Amendment. 93 He found it
particularly important that James Madison (the primary drafter of
the Second Amendment) based his version of the Second
Amendment on a Virginia proposal.94 This proposal was different
from many others considered in the drafting of the Bill of Rights
because it specifically rejected civilian firearm use and was
decidedly military in nature.95 The Stevens dissent also focused on
the conscientious objector provision that James Madison originally
included in the Second Amendment.96 This provision excused
people from military service if they had religious objections to
doing so; Justice Stevens believed that this demonstrated the
military nature of the right protected by the Amendment.
97
The final part of Justice Stevens' analysis examined the
Supreme Court's limited Second Amendment precedent.98 Though
disagreeing with the majority's interpretation of Cruikshank, he
nonetheless found that the case did not add much to the
understanding of the Second Amendment.99 While Presser did not
necessarily address the meaning of the Second Amendment, the
Stevens dissent found it to hold that the Second Amendment does
not prohibit gun regulation by the states or protect the "use of arms
outside the context of a militia . . .organized by the State or
Federal Government."' 00 Finally, the Stevens dissent placed great
emphasis on the last major Second Amendment case heard by the
Supreme Court-Miller.'10 Unlike the majority, Justice Stevens
found the Court's basic distinction to be between military and non-
military use of firearms. 10 2 Based on its understanding of the
holding of Miller, the Stevens dissent found that the Second
Amendment protects firearm use only within the context of the
militia.'0 3 In conclusion, Justice Stevens found the majority's
holding to break from a clear line of Supreme Court jurisprudence
regarding the nature of the Second Amendment. 104
93. Id. at 2831-42.




98. Id. at 2842-46.
99. Id. at 2843.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2845-46.
102. Id. at 2845.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2846.
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D. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Breyer
In the second dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer'0 5 focused on
the level of scrutiny to be used when determining the
constitutionality of a gun regulation. 10 6 Even though Justice Breyer
agreed with Justice Stevens as to the collective nature of the
Second Amendment, Justice Breyer based his dissent on the
assumption that the Second Amendment protects an individual
right to self-defense in accordance with the majority.' 07 The Breyer
dissent first criticized the majority for its finding that the District
of Columbia statute's absolute prohibition on the registration of
handguns would be unconstitutional under any level of scrutiny.1
08
For example, the statute would be constitutional under a rationality
review because the regulation bears a "rational relationship" to the
government's "'legitimate' life-saving objective" of preventing
gun-related accidents. 109 However, Justice Breyer admitted that the
use of a true strict scrutiny standard is impractical in evaluating the
constitutionality of gun regulations because every gun regulation
seeks to promote the compelling government interest of public
safety and crime prevention. 10 Public safety and crime prevention
are used to uphold statutes restricting personal liberties in a variety
of ways and are applicable in the context of gun regulation."'
In recognition of the difficulties in applying strict scrutiny to
gun regulations, the Breyer dissent proposed a solution to the
problem of evaluating the constitutionality of gun regulations.
112
Justice Breyer described his solution as follows: "[A]n interest-
balancing inquiry, with the interests protected by the Second
Amendment on one side and the governmental public-safety
concerns on the other, the only question being whether the
regulation at issue impermissibly burdens the former in the course
of advancing the latter.""13 To prove that this interest-balancing
inquiry would be a practical solution, Justice Breyer applied it to
the District of Columbia statute banning handgun registration."1
4
105. Justice Breyer was joined in his dissent by Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg. Id. at 2847.
106. Id. at 2850-53 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 2847.




112. Id. at 2851-52.
113. Id. at 2852.
114. Id. at 2854.
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First, Justice Breyer considered the municipal government's
objective in passing the statute. After providing pages of statistical
evidence regarding gun violence in both the District of Columbia
and the United States, he found that the city council pursued the
legitimate government objectives of public safety and crime
prevention in enacting the statute. 15 Justice Breyer then examined
"the extent to which" the statute "burdens the interests that the
Second Amendment seeks to protect."' 16 He noted that while the
statute imposed only a minimal burden on military and hunting
interests, it imposed a much more significant burden on an
individual's interest in self-defense." 7 In evaluating this burden on
the right of self-defense, Justice Breyer considered whether there
were less restrictive alternatives but determined that there were no
less restrictive means by which to reduce the number of handguns
in the District of Columbia than the total ban prescribed in the gun
regulations at issue.18 Finally, the Breyer dissent asked whether
the burden imposed on the Second Amendment interest in self-
defense was disproportionate. 19 Justice Breyer found that the
restriction imposed by the statute was not disproportionate because
it was narrowly tailored to the problems that the statute sought to
remedy.120 The statute only prohibited handguns, the weapon most
associated with violent crime and firearm deaths, and was limited
in scope to the urban area of the District of Columbia.12 1
Furthermore, the interest in self-defense protected by the Second
Amendment was only of secondary importance in comparison to
its main objective regarding the militia. 2 2 Justice Breyer
concluded by criticizing the majority for leaving cities without
viable gun regulations. 
2
Although the majority opinion in Heller found the Second
Amendment to protect an individual right to possess firearms, it
failed to answer many questions about the Second Amendment.
These questions include the scope of the right protected by the
Second Amendment, whether the Second Amendment should be
applicable to the states, 124 and the level of scrutiny to be used in




119. Id. at 2865.
120. Id. at 2865--66.
121. Id. at 2866.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2869.
124. The following analysis regarding the appropriate level of scrutiny for
violations of the Second Amendment assumes that the Second Amendment will
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evaluating the constitutionality of gun regulations. These questions
leave room for future litigation to determine the true impact of the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Second Amendment. Of the
several unanswered questions left in the wake of Heller, the level
of scrutiny has the most potential to transform American gun
regulations.
IV. LEVEL OF SCRUTINY
The Supreme Court traditionally uses three levels of
constitutional scrutiny-rationality review, intermediate scrutiny,
and strict scrutiny-in evaluating claims that a person's
constitutional rights have been infringed. Each of these three levels
of constitutional scrutiny contains two prongs in its analysis. 125
The first prong determines the government interest in a particular
regulation at issue, while the second prong examines the
connection between the government interest and the regulation.
126
Although both prongs change depending on the level of scrutiny,
the second prong is the more important prong because it usually
determines the constitutionality of the regulation. 127
be incorporated. At the time Heller was issued, the Second Amendment had not
been officially incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment so as to be
applicable against the states; in fact, Cruikshank specifically held that the
Second Amendment is a restriction only on the federal government. Cruikshank
v. United States, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). However, the modem test for
incorporation is derived from Duncan v. Louisiana and asks whether a particular
right "is necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty." 391 U.S.
145, 149 n.14 (1968). The Heller majority defines the right protected by the
Second Amendment in such a manner that it satisfies the Duncan test. The Court
recently granted certiorari to address the incorporation of the Second
Amendment. Otis McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 48 (2009).
125. For the two prongs of rationality review, see infra Part IV.A. For the
two prongs of strict scrutiny, see infra Part IV.B. For the two prongs of
intermediate scrutiny, see infra Part IV.C.
126. R. Randall Kelso, Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection
Clause and Related Constitutional Doctrines Protecting Individual Rights: The
"Base Plus Six" Model and Modern Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 225, 227 (2002).
127. The importance of the second prong of any given level of constitutional
scrutiny is especially clear when considering the constitutionality of gun
regulations. In the context of gun regulations, the government interests at
issue-regardless of the level of constitutional scrutiny-are always public
safety and crime prevention. Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second
Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REv. 683, 731 (2007). As a result, it has been
acknowledged that the connection between a particular regulation and these
government interests (i.e., the second prong) will be the main source of litigation
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A. Rationality Review
Rationality review is the minimal protection given to
constitutional rights.' 28 Rationality review answers the basic
question of whether a particular law is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.1 29 Courts often use rationality review
when evaluating the constitutionality of economic and social
welfare regulations. 30 Under this level of scrutiny, the courts
presume that statutes are constitutional. 13
Throughout the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court
used rationality review to evaluate infringements of the economic
rights protected by substantive due process.1 32 For example,
Lochner v. New York struck down a statute limiting the number of
hours that a baker could work per week as a violation of a baker's
liberty of contract protected by substantive due process. 33
However, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (Parrish) marked a
significant change in the Court's approach to economic substantive
due process claims.' 34 In Parrish, the Court upheld a state law
guaranteeing minimum wages for hotel maids, finding that the
state had furthered a legitimate government purpose by aiding
women, an economically disadvantaged group within society.
This judicial deference to economic regulations was confirmed by
the Court's opinion in Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma,
Inc.'36 Williamson essentially showed the Court's willingness to
find a rational basis for a legislature's actions regarding any sort of
economic regulation. Because rationality review has historically
been such a deferential standard of review reserved for economic
regulation, its usefulness in evaluating the constitutionality of gun
regulations seems highly unlikely.
Rationality review is the only level of scrutiny mentioned
specifically in the majority opinion of Heller.137 Although the
as gun regulations are challenged in the wake of Heller. Calvin Massey, Guns,
Extremists, and the Constitution, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1095, 1132 (2000).
128. Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Equal Protection Analysis, 29 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 121, 160-61 (1989).
129. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §
14.3 (7th ed. 2004).
130. Id. § 11.4.
131. Id. § 14.3
132. Id. §§ 11.3-.4.
133. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
134. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
135. Id. at 398-400.
136. 348 U.S. 483, 490 (1955).
137. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2818 n.27 (2008).
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majority's discussion of rationality review might be considered
dicta, Justice Scalia expressly found rationality review to be an
inappropriate level of constitutional scrutiny for gun regulations in
general: "If all that was required to overcome the right to keep and
bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be
redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational
laws, and would have no effect."' 138 However, Justice Scalia's
condemnation of rationality review as an appropriate level of
scrutiny is not immediately obvious, especially in light of Justice
Breyer's application of rationality review to the District of
Columbia statute at issue. 139 In passing, Justice Breyer found that
the statute could be upheld as constitutional using rationality
review because it had a rational relationship to the legitimate
objective of "prevent[ing] gun-related accidents."'140 Even though
his dissent applied rationality review to the statute, Justice Breyer
failed to address whether this level of constitutional scrutiny was
the proper way for courts to evaluate the constitutionality of gun
regulations. Based on courts' historical use of rationality review
and the Heller Court's explicit dismissal of that level of scrutiny,
courts should not use rationality review to determine the
constitutionality of gun regulations.
B. Strict Scrutiny
In contrast to rationality review, strict scrutiny is the highest
level of protection afforded to constitutional rights. 14 1 Strict
scrutiny allows restriction of a constitutional right only when the
restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government
interest. 142 This level of scrutiny requires an extremely close
connection between the restriction and the compelling government
interest; in other words, a court asks whether the particular
restriction is necessary to promote the government's compelling
interest. 143 The Supreme Court has used this level of constitutional
scrutiny in a variety of contexts, including content-based
restrictions on the right of free speech protected by the First
138. Id.
139. See id, at 2851 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
140. Id.
141. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Review, 54 UCLA
L. REv. 1267 (2007) (discussing the development of strict scrutiny to provide
greater protection for constitutional rights than that provided by rationality
review).
142. NOwAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 129, § 14.3.
143. Id.
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Amendment; 144 infringement of fundamental rights protected by
substantive due process; 45 and equal protection in those cases
involving suspect classes, such as race 146 or alienage, 147 and
fundamental fights, such as the right to vote.
148
At first glance, strict scrutiny appears to be the logical level of
scrutiny that courts should use in evaluating the constitutionality of
gun regulations. The Fifth Circuit, the first federal appellate court
to endorse an individual right interpretation of the Second
Amendment, anticipated the use of strict scrutiny in evaluating gun
regulations. 49 In discussing what restrictions on the individual
right to keep and bear arms would be acceptable, the court found
that this right could be restricted by "limited, narrowly tailored
specific exceptions."'' 50 The court's holding that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right strongly implies that the
right is fundamental and thereby invokes a classic application of
strict scrutiny. Furthermore, the court referred explicitly to the
second prong of the strict scrutiny test in allowing only those
restrictions on the Second Amendment that are narrowly tailored.
Another argument in favor of the application of strict scrutiny
to the Second Amendment depends on whether the right protected
by the Second Amendment is considered fundamental. Because the
Second Amendment will likely be incorporated through the
Fourteenth Amendment to apply to states,' 5 ' at least the core right
144. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (finding a city
ordinance banning a certain type of symbolic speech unconstitutional because it
was not "necessary to achieve [the city's] compelling interests"); Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam opinion finding the Ohio Criminal
Syndicalism Act unconstitutional for its failure to distinguish between advocacy
and speech that is intended to incite unlawful activity).
145. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding a
Connecticut statute preventing the use of contraception unconstitutional).
146. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding a Virginia
miscegenation statute unconstitutional because it had no legitimate purpose
other than invidious racial discrimination); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944) (finding that restrictions that infringe the rights of a particular racial
group are suspect and subject to "the most rigid scrutiny").
147. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (finding an
Arizona statute denying aliens welfare benefits unconstitutional, holding that
classifications based on alienage "are inherently suspect and subject to close
judicial scrutiny").
148. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)
(finding a Virginia poll tax unconstitutional, holding "wealth or fee paying [has]
no relation to voting qualifications; the right to vote is too precious, too
fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned").
149. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 261 (5th Cir. 2001).
150. Id.
151. See supra note 124.
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of the Second Amendment-the right of self-defense 152 -will also
likely be classified as a fundamental right. 153 Even though a lower
level of constitutional review may be used to examine a regulation
that infringes on a fundamental right, 154 strict scrutiny is
traditionally used when the core of a fundamental right has been
substantially restricted by a paiticular regulation. 55 Presuming that
the right of self-defense protected by the Second Amendment is
classified as a fundamental right, strict scrutiny is the appropriate
level of constitutional review to evaluate cases involving a severe
burden on that right. 1
56
This application of strict scrutiny is consistent with the
treatment of the District of Columbia statute at issue in Heller. The
government will likely seek to further the same objectives of
public safety and crime prevention in crafting any gun regulation.
As mentioned in the dissent by Justice Breyer, both of these
objectives are compelling government interests.157 As a result,
virtually all gun regulations, including the statute in Heller, would
at least satisfy the first prong of the strict scrutiny test. On the other
hand, a virtual prohibition on handguns like the District of
Columbia statute in Heller would not satisfy the second prong of
the test because it severely burdened the core of the right protected
by the Second Amendment-the right of self-defense. Less
restrictive means are available to further the government's interest
152. See Part II.A; see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2873,
2817-18 (2008) (holding that "the inherent right of self-defense has been central
to the Second Amendment right" and referring to "the core lawful purpose of
self-defense" within the Second Amendment).
153. See supra Part III.B. Heller defines the right protected by the Second
Amendment in such a way as to satisfy the Duncan test of fundamentality for
incorporation. Nelson Lund, Anticipating the Second Amendment Incorporation:
The Role of the Inferior Courts, 59 SYRACUSE L. REv. 185, 193-96 (2008). Even
though the test for incorporation as expressed by Duncan and the determination
of a right as fundamental are not identical, the Court has appeared willing to
recognize that a right that satisfies the incorporation test should also be treated
as a fundamental right. Janice Baker, The Next Step in Second Amendment
Analysis: Incorporating the Right to Bear Arms into the Fourteenth Amendment,
28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 35, 55 (2002).
154. See discussion infra Part IV.C. 1.
155. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (using
strict scrutiny to find a Minnesota statute unconstitutional because it burdened
political speech, often considered the core of the right of free speech).
156. Baker, supra note 153, at 55.
157. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2851 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[A]lmost every gun-
control regulation will seek to advance (as the one here does) a 'primary concern
of every government-a concern for the safety and indeed the lives of its
citizens.' . . . The Court has deemed that interest, as well as the 'the
Government's general interest in preventing crime' to be 'compelling."'
(quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987))).
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in public safety and crime prevention than a strict curtailment of an
individual's right of self-defense. 158 In sum, strict scrutiny appears
to be an appropriate level of review when a particular gun
regulation directly interferes with the fundamental right of self-
defense protected by the Second Amendment.
Despite the seeming ease with which strict scrutiny can be
applied to the District of Columbia statute, the use of strict scrutiny
is much more limited with regard to the vast majority of the
nation's other gun regulations. The extremely restrictive District of
Columbia statute is an outlier among the nation's gun
regulations. 159 One legal scholar even noted prior to Heller that the
statute at issue in the case had the potential to be one of the few
gun regulations ever found unconstitutional in violation of the
Second Amendment. 160 Unlike the District of Columbia statute,
most gun regulations do not infringe upon the core right of self-
defense protected by the Second Amendment. 161 Because these
regulations do not violate the fundamental right of self-defense,
strict scrtiny is an inappropriate level of constitutional review to
evaluate the constitutionality of the vast majority of gun
regulations.
C. Intermediate Scrutiny: Reasonableness Review
The final traditional level of constitutional review, commonly
referred to as intermediate scrutiny, falls between rationality
review and strict scrutiny. Despite its frequent references to strict16216
scrutiny and rationality review,1 63 the Supreme Court has never
formally recognized intermediate scrutiny per se as a level of
constitutional scrutiny, instead using a variety of labels to describe
this medium level of scrutiny. Regardless of the name used to
describe it, this level of scrutiny requires that a particular
restriction have a substantial relationship to an important
government interest. 164 The Court often employs intermediate
158. See generally Part V.
159. Kenneth A. Klukowski, Armed by Right: The Emerging Jurisprudence
of the Second Amendment, 18 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTs. L. J. 167, 178 (2008).
160. Id. at 179.
161. See generally Part V.
162. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
163. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Mass. Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
164. NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 129, § 14.3.
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scrutiny in the context of equal protection in those cases involving
quasi-suspect classes such as gender' 65 or illegitimacy.' 66 The
Court has also applied this less stringent standard of review when
addressing violations of fundamental rights, including restrictions
on the time, place, and manner of speech in the context of the First
Amendment 67 and the undue burden standard articulated in the
context of substantive due process. 68
The generally accepted approach to intermediate scrutiny
operates in much the same way that strict scrutiny would operate in
evaluating the constitutionality of gun regulations. 69 The
important government interests in intermediate scrutiny are the
same as the compelling government interests in strict scrutiny-
public safety and crime prevention. 170 In addition, the second
prong of strict scrutiny, which requires narrowly tailored
restrictions, is similar in theory to the second prong of intermediate
scrutiny, which requires a substantial relationship between the
regulation and the important government interest. Despite these
similarities in the levels of scrutiny, statutes are more likely to
survive constitutional challenges under intermediate scrutiny than
under strict scrutiny. 1
72
Beyond the traditional two-pronged test of intermediate
scrutiny, the Supreme Court often applies this level of
constitutional review in a much more flexible manner known as
reasonableness review. Reasonableness review considers whether
the burden that a regulation imposes on a constitutional right is
reasonable. 173 Under this more flexible approach, intermediate
165. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding
Virginia Military Institute's admission policy of only admitting males
unconstitutional); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (finding a statute
preventing the sale of alcohol to men under the age of twenty-one and to women
under the age of eighteen unconstitutional).
166. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (finding a state
probation statute unconstitutional because it prevented an illegitimate child from
receiving an inheritance from his father and criticizing the state court for failing
to properly evaluate the relationship between the statute and the state's objective
of an efficient probate system).
167. See discussion infra Part IV.C.l.a.
168. See discussion infra Part IV.C. 1.b.
169. Winkler, supra note 127, at 731.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 731-32.
172. Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and
Strict Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 358 (2006). See generally Gerald
Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972) (describing
the Supreme Court's application of strict scrutiny as "fatal in fact").
173. NOwAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 129, § 14.3.
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scrutiny acts as a stronger level of rationality review because a
legislature must prove that the law at issue actually advances
public safety and prevents crime-not simply that the law would
be a rational way to promote these interests as is required under
the traditional rationality review standard.'? 4 The reasonableness
review of intermediate scrutiny would consider whether the
regulation imposed on the individual right to keep and bear arms is
justified by the actual social benefits resulting from that
restriction. At the same time, the reasonableness review of
intermediate scrutiny serves as a less stringent level of review than
strict scrutiny when the law at issue does not prevent the exercise
of an individual right. Consequently, the reasonableness review of
intermediate scrutiny appears to resolve many of the problems that
traditional rationality review and strict scrutiny pose in evaluating
the constitutionality of gun regulations.
In applying this intermediate level of review, courts frequently
refer to legislative findings and statistics.17 6 As indicated by the
extensive statistical data provided in Justice Breyer' s dissent,
77
gun regulations are often supported by a vast amount of legislative
findings regarding the dagSers of guns across the nation and
especially in urban areas. These legislative findings can assist
courts in determining whether the statute at issue actually furthers
the government's interest in enacting that statute. Additionally,
these legislative findings allow a court to evaluate a particular
statute in light of the problems that may be unique to a jurisdiction,
such as the jurisdiction's urban nature.' 79 For example, Justice
Breyer provided statistical data regarding the crime rate in the
District of Columbia following the implementation of the handgun
prohibition at issue.180 If the majority in Heller had applied
intermediate scrutiny to evaluate the constitutionality of the
District of Columbia statute, the Court could have found that the
statute was not furthering the important government interest of
174. See Kelso, supra note 126, at 228.
175. Mark Tushnet, A Symposium on Firearms, the Militia and Safe Cities:
Merging History, Constitutional Law and Public Policy, 1 ALB. Gov'T L. REV.
354, 358 (2008).
176. NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 129, § 14.5.
177. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2854-61 (2008)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
178. See, e.g., Brief of Academics as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent, Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (No. 07-290).
179. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2861-62 (citing Los Angeles v. Alameda Books,
Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 440 (2002)).
180. Id.
NOTE2010] 1081
1LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
crime prevention because the crime rate actually increased in the
wake of the handgun prohibition.
18 1
The acceptance of the reasonableness review of intermediate
scrutiny and the rejection of rationality review and strict scrutiny is
the best solution to the problem of evaluating the constitutionality
of gun regulations. Not only has this reasonableness review of
intermediate scrutiny been used by the Supreme Court in a variety
of constitutional contexts, it is the standard of review used b
states in evaluating the constitutionality of gun regulations.
Applied to gun regulations, the reasonableness review of
intermediate scrutiny results in a balancing test that considers the
interest of the government in public safety and crime prevention in
light of any infringement by a particular gun regulation on the
individual right to keep and bear arms as protected by the Second
Amendment.
1. Supreme Court Precedent
a. First Amendment
A comparison to the level of scrutiny used to evaluate alleged
First Amendment violations provides the best model for the
effective application of the reasonableness review of intermediate
scrutiny. The Heller majority endorsed the comparison between
the First Amendment and the Second Amendment, noting that the
right to keep and bear arms may be sub*ect to limitations in the
same way that the right of free speech is.1  This comparison seems
particularly appropriate in light of the historical litigation trends of
the First and Second Amendments. Neither amendment was the
subject of extensive litigation in early American history. 184 Rather,
the First Amendment was extensively litigated beginning in the
181. Id. It is important to note that the Heller majority would likely interpret
the statistics regarding the District of Columbia statute at issue in direct contrast
to Justice Breyer's own conclusions.
182. See Part IV.C.1-2.
183. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at2799.
184. The free speech aspect of the First Amendment was not the subject of
much litigation prior to the early twentieth century following World War I. The
protection of free speech became a subject of litigation before the Supreme
Court in light of the Espionage Act and Sedition Act, statutes designed to
prevent speech undermining America's efforts in World War I. The famous case
of Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), opened the floodgates of First
Amendment jurisprudence. G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of
Age: The Emergence of Free Speech in Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH.
L. REv. 299, 310-11 (1996); see also Van Alstyne, supra note 28, at 1239,
1241.
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early twentieth century, eventually culminatin5 in the present body
of complex First Amendment jurisprudence." This parallels the
Second Amendment-rarely the subject of litigation from the time
of its ratification but now experiencing an explosion of litigation
following its rediscovery in Heller.
Though the right of free speech is a fundamental right, courts
do not necessarily apply strict scrutiny to all regulations that
impact the First Amendment.18 6 Rather, courts divide First
Amendment restrictions into several categories, which are
analyzed using different levels of scrutiny. For example,
restrictions on the content of speech are subject to strict scrutiny,
while content-neutral restrictions on speech, such as time, manner,
and place restrictions, are subject to a reasonableness review that is
comparable to the reasonableness review of intermediate
scrutiny. 87 Similarly, like content-neutral restrictions on speech,
restrictions on the individual Second Amendment right to keep and
bear arms may be analyzed under an intermediate level of
scrutiny. 188 This analysis would require courts to develop a
framework that fits the needs of the Second Amendment; this
might include categorizing restrictions based on what class of
people can possess firearms, places where firearms may be used,
and the types of firearms a person may possess. Under this
framework, courts would apply an intermediate level of scrutiny
when considering the constitutionality of government restrictions
falling within the aforementioned categories.
While this analogy to First Amendment constitutional scrutiny
analysis appears to be readily applicable to the developing body of
Second Amendment jurisprudence, it does not provide a solution to
the questions left unanswered by Heller. The First Amendment
categories have developed after many years of extensive litigation
over alleged violations of the rights protected by the First
Amendment.' 89 Continued litigation over the rights protected by
the Second Amendment in the wake of Heller will likely result in a
similar development of categories. However, as many gun
regulations will likely be challenged in the near future, lower
courts need a workable solution as to how to determine the
constitutionality of gun regulations now. As a result, the Supreme
Court's application of the reasonableness review of intermediate
185. See White, supra note 184.
186. Klukowski, supra note 159, at 186-87.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 187-88.
189. See generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test that Ate Everything:
Intermediate Scrutiny in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv.
783 (2007).
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scrutiny in other constitutional contexts, such as substantive due
process, serves as a more practical example of this level of review.
b. Fundamental Rights
The Supreme Court has also utilized a balancing test in cases
involving fundamental rights specifically enumerated within the
Constitution.190 One such precedent is Burdick v. Takushi, in which
the Supreme Court articulated a balancing test for considering the
reasonableness of a regulation that allegedly violates a plaintiffs
right to vote. 191 In fact, the Court phrased the issue in the case as
follows: "[W]hether Hawaii's prohibition on write-in voting
unreasonably infringes upon its citizens' right under the First and
Fourteenth Amendment."' 192 Burdick was a citizen of Hawaii who
wanted to vote for a person who had not filed nominating papers in
the primary and general elections.1 93 He was informed by an
opinion letter from the Hawaii Attorney General's office that such
"write-in voting" was not permitted under current state election
law. 194 While acknowledging that the right to vote is a fundamental
right, the Court maintained that the right to vote is not a right
without limitations. 195 The Court specifically rejected the
application of strict scrutiny to all voting regulations and adopted a
more flexible approach.' 9 The Court established a reasonable
regulation balancing test, weighing the injury imposed by an
alleged violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments against
the purported government interests in limiting an individual's
constitutional rights. 197 The Court held that only a minimal burden
was imposed on Burdick's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights
by the state's denial of his request for write-in voting. 98 Rather,
the ballot access system already in place in accordance with state
law provided ample opportunity "to make free choices and to
associate politically through the vote."'
' 99
190. See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 129, § 14.3 (describing
the standard of review used by the Supreme Court in cases involving
fundamental rights).
191. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
192. Id. at 430 (emphasis added).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 433-34.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 434.
198. Id. at 438-39.
199. Id.
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Burdick demonstrates the advantages of applying a similar
reasonableness review to gun regulations. Like the right to vote,
the individual right to keep and bear arms is subject to some
limits.20 A reasonable regulation balancing test is particularly
appropriate for fundamental rights because it ensures that an
individual fundamental right is infringed upon only if the
government's interests are considered more important than the
individual's right. For example, in Burdick a plaintiffs right to
vote in any conceivable manner was infringed upon because the
state's interest in having an efficient democracy was more
important.201 The same analysis could be applied to a statute
prohibiting citizens from carrying a firearm into a federal
courthouse. As indicated by Heller, an individual has a right to
keep and bear arms for self-defense; however, the need for self-
defense is arguably less important in the context of a federal
courthouse than it is in a person's own home. 20 2 As a result, a
government's interests in public safety within its own buildings
and the efficient administration of the law outweighs a citizen's
individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense in that
particular situation.
Another case in which the Supreme Court used a balancing test
to determine infringement of an individual right is Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (Casey), which
arose from the constitutional challenge of several Pennsylvania
statutes imposing limitations on a woman's ability to have an
abortion.20 3 In reaffirming Roe v. Wade's basic holding that a
woman has a right to an abortion before the point of viability, three
Justices held that restrictions on a woman's right to have an
abortion are constitutional provided that they do not impose an
"undue burden" on such right.20 4 The Court further explained that
an undue burden is a state regulation that places a "substantial
obstacle" in the vath of a woman's choice to have an abortion of a
nonviable fetus.
The undue burden standard articulated in Casey could have
potentially interesting effects in determining the constitutionality
of gun regulations. First, whether a woman's right to an abortion is
fundamental remains somewhat questionable after the Court's
200. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816 (2008).
201. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 441.
202. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817.
203. 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
204. Id. at 844, 874.
205. Id. at 877.
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decision in Casey;2 0 6 similarly, the Court has yet to explicitly state
that the Second Amendment individual right to bear arms is a
fundamental right.20 7 While the Second Amendment right will
likely be recognized as a fundamental right by the Supreme Court,
the undue burden standard set forth in Casey serves as a legitimate
standard of review until the Court makes such a determination.
In addition, the undue burden standard that the Court applied to
a series of state abortion statutes is likewise applicable to state gun
regulations. Applying the undue burden standard allowed the Court
to evaluate a series of allegedly unconstitutional statutes within the
greater body of laws governing that particular subject.20 8 In short,
this standard of analysis allows a court to determine whether any
statute imposes an undue burden on a particular right in light of the
other unchallenged restrictions on the same subject. One can infer
that this type of analysis was utilized in the Heller opinion, which
did not consider the constitutionality of firearm licensing
requirements, but did find the blanket prohibition of handguns to
be unconstitutional.20 9
c. Fourth Amendment
Finally, the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
also provides excellent examples of the successful application of a
reasonable regulation balancing test standard of review to an
enumerated constitutional right. Because the Fourth Amendment,
like the Second Amendment, is part of the Bill of Rights and is
granted special protection as a result, Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is a particularly applicable analogy for the Second
Amendment. In addition, the Fourth Amendment is unquestionably
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment to be applicable
to the states 210 as the Second Amendment is expected to be in light
of Heller.21 f
The Court uses a reasonable regulation balancing test to
examine alleged violations of the individual right protected by the
206. See id. at 871-72 (declining to follow cases that applied strict scrutiny
to a woman's right of abortion).
207. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821 (acknowledging that the parameters of the
Second Amendment were not fully defined by the opinion).
208. Casey, 505 U.S. at 844.
209. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2819, 2821-22.
210. See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule applicable to state courts); Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 (1949) (incorporating the Fourth Amendment so as to be applicable to
state governments).
211. See supra note 124.
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Fourth Amendment. Delaware v. Prouse (Prouse) is one of many
precedents that demonstrates the effective application of
reasonableness review to this enumerated constitutional right.212 In
evaluating whether the officer's search of the defendant's car was a
violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Court developed the
following reasonable regulation balancing test: "The permissibility
of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its
intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against
its promotion of legitimate governmental interests." 2 3 First, the
Court acknowledged that the state has a legitimate interest in
ensuring that drivers are qualified to operate cars and that those
cars meet minimum standards of safe operation.214 Thus, the Court
found that the state has a legitimate interest in checking drivers'
licenses and registrations.2' 5However, the Court held that this
public safety interest did not justify the infringement of the
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights through the arbitrary traffic
stop administered in Prouse.21 6 The Court ultimately held that the
search at issue was unreasonable and violated the Fourth
Amendment.
217
Prouse demonstrates two major advantages of a reasonable
regulation balancing test. First, a balancing test can provide
significant protection of an individual's constitutional rights even
when the government has a compelling interest. The government
interest in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is often public safety
or crime investigation-both of which are considered compelling
government interests. In the same manner, the government interest
will always be compelling within the context of the Second
Amendment. Despite the compelling government interest present
in any action challenging a gun regulation, a balancing test
prevents courts from automatically deferring to the government
without giving proper consideration to the individual constitutional
right to keep and bear arms. Second, it demonstrates that a
balancing test can be appropriate for a variety of situations. For
example, a court may apply the Fourth Amendment balancing test
to a search of a defendant's car,218 person,2 19 or home. 22W The
212. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
213. Id. at 654.
214. Id. at 658.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 659.
217. Id. at 663.
218. See id. at 648; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
219. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757 (1966).
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inherent flexibility in a reasonable regulation balancing test is
appropriate for the variety of gun regulations enacted at the
federal, state, and local levels that control everything related to
guns, including where guns can be used, what types of guns may
be lawfully possessed, and the manner in which guns may be used.
2. Application by States
In addition to its strong presence in a variety of Supreme Court
precedents, another benefit of adopting a reasonable regulation
balancing test for evaluating the constitutionality of gun
regulations is the states' continued application of this standard of
review. Unlike the federal government, which has only recently
recognized an individual right to keep and bear arms, states have
long interpreted their constitutional equivalents of the Second
Amendment to protect an individual right.22' States have
traditionally used a "reasonable regulation" standard in
determining whether particular gun regulations infringe the
individual right to keep and bear arms protected by their own
constitutional provisions.2 22 The reasonable regulation standard
asks the basic question of "whether the challenged law is a
reasonable method of regulating the right to bear arms."223 Like the
reasonable regulation balancing test proposed by this Note, the
reasonable regulation standard applied by the states involves a
balancing of the state government's objective and the degree to
which an individual's rights are burdened.224 For example, in State
v. Blanchard the Louisiana Supreme Court addressed the proper
interpretation of a statute that prohibits a person from possessinj a
firearm while also possessing a controlled dangerous substance.
The court found that the statute was not overbroad because it was
"clearly reasonable for the legislature in the interest of the public
welfare and safety to prohibit the constructive possession of
firearms in connection with the commission of drug offenses." 22
6
The court then confirmed that this sort of reasonableness review is
common in evaluating gun regulations: "This is consistent with our
220. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961).
221. See Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights to Keep and Bear Arms,
11 TEX. REv. L. & POL. 191 (2008).
222. Winkler, supra note 127, at 716.
223. Id. at 717.
224. Id.
225. State v. Blanchard, 776 So. 2d 1165, 1167 (La. 2001).
226. Id. at 1173.
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prior holdings wherein we found that other statutes reasonably
limiting a citizen's right to bear arms were constitutional. 227
Under the reasonable regulation balancing test standard of
review, most gun regulations survive constitutional challenges.
228
The most commonly challenged gun regulations that are upheld by
state courts include prohibitions on the possession of sawed-off
shotguns and so-called "assault weapons," prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons, and deferential licensing
requirements such as concealed weapon permits.229 For example,
the West Virginia Supreme Court recently decided whether a state
law that prohibits felons from possessing firearms violates a state
constitutional provision that protects an individual right to bear
arms for self-defense, hunting, and recreational use.2 30 In
upholding the constitutionality of the statute at issue, the court held
that "[t]he restrictions contained [within the statute prohibiting
felons from possessing firearms] are a proper exercise of the
Legislature's police power to protect the citizenry of this State and
impose reasonable limitations on the right to keep and bear arms
to achieve this end.",231 The court further found that the limitations
imposed by the statute were not "unreasonable." 232 In fact, state
courts have found gun regulations to be unconstitutional in only
the most extreme circumstances-regulations that either
completely destroy the individual right to keep and bear arms or
limit the right to the point that it becomes nominal in nature. 233 In
conclusion, state court jurisprudence addressing the
constitutionality of gun regulations provides many examples of the
effectiveness of a reasonable regulation balancing test standard of
review.
3. Practicality
Finally, adoption of a reasonable regulation balancing test is a
practical solution to the problem of determining the
constitutionality of gun regulations. In light of the many questions
left unanswered by Heller, one scholar offered the simple advice
that litigants should be prepared to attack or defend Justice
227. Id.
228. Winler, supranote 127, at 717.
229. Id. at 720-22.
230. Rohrbaugh v. State, 607 S.E.2d 404, 412 (W. Va. 2004).
231. Id. at 414 (emphasis added).
232. Id.
233. Winler, supra note 127, at 722.
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Breyer's interest balancing inquiry in future litigation.23 4
Furthermore, a flexible approach to the constitutionality of gun
regulations is necessary in light of the weighty interests on both
sides of this balance-the fundamental individual right of self-
defense versus the compelling government interest in public safety.
This flexible approach prevents both of these important
considerations from being infringed upon unnecessarily. The
reasonable regulation balancing test proposed by this Note offers
the most flexibility to courts and litigants as inevitable challenges
to the constitutionality of gun regulations arise in the wake of
Heller.
V. APPLICATION OF THE BALANCING TEST
In light of the landmark decision in Heller, opponents of gun
control will likely challenge existing regulations on constitutional
grounds. In anticipation of this increased litigation, this Note
applies the proposed reasonable regulation balancing test to
existing federal firearms provisions, gun regulations promulgated
by the state of Louisiana, and gun laws of three significant urban
areas in the United States: New Orleans, Chicago, and New York
City.
A. Federal Gun Regulations
Federal legislation will likely be subject to constitutional
review in light of Heller. Eighteen U.S.C. § 922 includes a long list
of unlawful acts involving firearms. 235 One section of this statute
provides a list of individuals to whom the sale of a firearm is
prohibited, including persons who have been indicted or convicted
of a crime punishable by a year imprisonment,2 36 who are addicted-237 l.3
to a controlled substance, or who are mentally ill.238 This
approach to preventing certain persons from possessing firearms
falls within the traditional prohibitions endorsed by Heller.239
Applying the reasonable regulation balancing test, the federal
government has interests in public safety and crime prevention.
2 40
On the other hand, the individuals in question have either done
234. Glenn Reynolds & Brannon Denning, Heller's Future in the Lower
Courts, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 406, 414 (2008).
235. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2006).
236. Id. § 922(g)(1).
237. Id. § 922(g)(3).
238. Id. § 922(g)(4).
239. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816-17 (2008).
240. Id. at 2851 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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something to diminish their access to certain rights (such as
convicted felons) or are not in an appropriate mental state to
exercise certain rights (such as the mentally ill or people under the
influence of drugs). Considering the danger associated with the
improper use of firearms, the government's interests in public
safety and crime prevention outweigh these particular individuals'
right to keep and bear arms. Thus, this provision of federal firearm
regulations will likely survive constitutional scrutiny.
In addition to proscribing certain acts involving firearms, § 922
also prohibits the sale of certain firearms, including machine guns,
short-barreled shotguns, and short-barreled rifles." Applying the
reasonable regulation balancing test, the federal government has
interests in public safety and crime prevention, especially because
the prohibited firearms are extremely dangerous and often used in
the perpetration of crimes.242 The individual's interest could be
potentially broad in this scenario and encompass the right of self-
defense, recreational use, and hunting. However, it is unlikely that
the prohibition at issue unreasonably burdens any of these potential
individual rights because the prohibited weapons are not traditional
means of exercising any of these rights. Once again, this provision
of federal firearm regulation will likely survive constitutional
scrutiny.
B. Louisiana Gun Regulations
The Louisiana Legislature has enacted regulations governing
firearms statewide, which are addressed in a variety of state
243laws. Like many states, Louisiana's constitution contains a
provision addressing the right to keep and bear arms. 2 " One
Louisiana statute requires that every person who possesses a
firearm register that firearm with the Department of Public Safety,
provide basic identification information about himself, and identify
the place where the firearm is usually kept.245 Applying the
proposed reasonable regulation balancing test, the conflicting
interests of the state government and individual firearm owners
must be examined. The state's interest, as it will be in virtually all
gun regulations, is public safety. Registration of firearms promotes
241. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(4) (2006).
242. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2855-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (providing
statistical data on handgun related injuries and crimes).
243. See LA. CONST. art. 1, § 1; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:37.4, :64.3,
:67.15, :69.1, :91, :94-95.2, :95.4-95.8 (2004); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§
40:1379.3-.3.1, :1751-55, :1781-92, :1796-99, :1801-04 (2008).
244. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
245. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1783 (2008).
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public safety by allowing the state to account for all legally owned
firearms and prevent firearm ownership by unsafe persons (such as
the mentally ill). The individual interest is broad in this situation; it
encompasses a right to keep and bear arms for purposes of self-
defense, hunting, and recreational use. Requiring the registration of
all firearms does not unreasonably burden an individual's right to
keep and bear arms for any of these purposes because the
registration does not restrict an individual from owning a firearm
or from using a firearm in the manner he wishes. Thus, the basic
registration requirement imposed by Louisiana on individual
firearms is constitutional because it does not unreasonably burden
the individual right to keep and bear arms.
Louisiana also has more particular gun regulations regarding
concealed handguns.246 One statute provides that the pertinent state
official must issue a concealed handgun permit to a qualified
candidate.247 The next part of the statute restricts certain persons
from receiving a concealed handgun permit.248 A person applying
for a concealed handgun must comply with certain requirements:
the person must be the minimum age of twenty-one, must not have
any sort of physical or mental handicap or illness that would
prevent the safe operation of a handgun, must not be a felon, and
must prove competence with a handgun. 249 The statute also
provides restrictions on where a concealed handgun may be
carried, including police stations courthouses, places of worship,
and firearm-free school zones. 256 Louisiana's concealed handgun
permit statute contains many of the categorical prohibitions that
Heller suggests are constitutional, including prohibitions against
handgun possession by felons and mentally ill persons as well as
prohibitions against handgun possession in sensitive areas such as
government buildings and schools.25'
As indicated in Heller, these categorical prohibitions against
certain types of firearm possession are constitutional because they
do not unreasonably burden an individual's right to keep and bear
arms for self-defense or recreational use.2 52 First, regarding the
categorical prohibitions as to who may not possess firearms, these
people have either done something to diminish their access to
certain rights (such as convicted felons) or are not in an
appropriate position to exercise certain rights (such as mentally ill
246. Id. §40:1379.3-.3.1.
247. Id. § 40:1379.3(A)(1).
248. Id. § 40:1379.3(C).
249. Id. § 40:1379.3(C)-(D).
250. Id. §40:1379.3(N).
251, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816-17 (2008).
252. See id. at 2822.
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people or minors). The dangers associated with the improper use of
these firearms-potential commission of crimes by convicted
felons and an increased chance of harm to self or family members
by mentally ill people or minors--outweigh these particular
individuals' right to keep and bear arms for purposes of self-
defense, recreational use, or hunting. Second, regarding the
categorical prohibition as to places where firearms may not be
possessed, the government has particular interests in public safety
or the efficient administration of the law. Once again, these
government interests outweigh the individual right of self-defense
in these particular areas.
Applying the proposed reasonable regulation balancing test, the
statute's requirement that a permittee prove competence with a
handgun also passes constitutional review. While a showing of
handgun competence greatly promotes the state interest in public
safety, it does not appreciably burden the individual right to keep
and bear arms for self-defense. In fact, such a requirement
enhances an individual's effective use of a handgun.
C. New Orleans Gun Regulations
Like many urban areas, the City of New Orleans has stricter
gun regulations than those enacted by the state legislature. The first
New Orleans gun regulation at issue provides for a blanket
prohibition on the discharge of firearms within the city.
253
However, the statute contains many exceptions to this prohibition,
including shooting galleries, target ranges, and hunting in certain
areas.
254
Under the reasonable regulation balancing test, the city's
interest in enforcing this statute is public safety. At first glance,
this blanket prohibition of firearm discharge may appear
unconstitutional because it prohibits an individual's use of a
firearm. However, the statute provides for several exceptions in
which an individual can engage in the recreational use of a firearm,
such as target practice and hunting. These statutory restrictions on
the recreational use of a firearm appear to be reasonable in light of
the urban nature of New Orleans. Yet, the statute does not include
a self-defense exception to the blanket prohibition of firearm
discharge within the city. On the face of the statute, a person who
discharges a lawful firearm in self-defense within the city would
violate this particular statute. If a court were to interpret the statute
literally, it would substantially burden the lawful exercise of the
253. NEW ORLEANs, LA., CODE § 54-335(a) (2008).
254. Id. § 54-335(b).
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individual right of self-defense as protected by the Second
Amendment and should be struck down as unconstitutional.
D. Chicago Gun Regulations
Like Louisiana, the Illinois state constitution contains a
provision addressing the right to keep and bear arms.255 While the
state constitution protects this I _ht, the City of Chicago maintains
its own set of gun regulations. One Chicago ordinance requires
that both a "safety mechanism" and a "load indicator device" must
be placed on a handgun at the time of sale.257 The ordinance then
provides specific examples of safety mechanisms, including trigger
locks, combination handle locks, and solenoid use-limitation
devices.258 Another Chicago ordinance requires that all firearms
within the city be registered 25 9 However, certain types of firearms
are deemed to be "unregisterable."26 ° Handguns, unless they were
validly registered odIor to the enactment of the statute, are banned
from registration. The owners of those handguns that were
previously validly registered must also demonstrate that the
handguns have both a safety mechanism and a load indicator
device.262
The potential constitutional problems with these ordinances are
compounded when examined together; as such, these ordinances
would probably be found unconstitutional in light of Heller. The
city's interest in enacting such stringent restrictions on handguns is
the concern for public safety in the populous urban environment of
Chicago. In addition to the blanket prohibition of handgun
registration, handguns are rendered ineffective for self-defense
purposes by the required attachment of a safety mechanism. Like
the statute in Heller, the Chicago ordinance requiring registration
essentially prevents an individual from using a handgun for self-
defense within the home.263 While Chicago residents are allowed
to have firearms within their residence, they are not allowed to use
handguns, which, as discussed in Heller, is the most effective
means of self-defense. 264 As a result, these ordinances should be
255. ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 22.
256. See CHI., ILL., CODE §§ 4-144, 8-20, 8-24 (2008).
257. Id. § 4-144-062.
258. Id.
259. Id. § 8-20-040.
260. Id.; id. § 8-20-050.
261. CHI., ILL., CODE § 8-2-050(c)(1) (2008).
262. Id. § 8-20-050 (c)(1)(i)-(ii).
263. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817-18 (2008).
264. Id. at 2818.
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struck down as unconstitutional violations of the individual Second
Amendment right of self-defense.
Chicago's Municipal Code also provides for a blanket
prohibition against firearm possession on a person's body or in a
vehicle.265 However, this prohibition is not applicable to a person
who is on his own property, in his residence, or in his place of
business. 266 Applying the reasonable regulation balancing test to
this ordinance, the city's interests in enacting this ordinance are
public safety and crime prevention. While the ordinance does
prevent an individual from carrying a firearm wherever he desires,
it does not unreasonably burden the exercise of the individual right
of self-defense under the Second Amendment. The ordinance at
issue unequivocally allows individuals to possess firearms for self-
defense within their homes and places of business, both of which
are environments that an individual is mostly likely to exercise
such a right, as recognized in Heller.267 Thus, this ordinance will
likely pass constitutional review.
E. New York City Gun Regulations
Unlike the Louisiana and Illinois constitutions, the New York
Constitution does not address the right to keep and bear arms.
268
Not surprisingly, New York City, like New Orleans and Chicago,
has its own set of provisions regulating firearms within city limits.
New York City issues six different forms of handgun licenses; in
light of Heller, the Premises-Residence or Business License is the
most interesting to examine. 269 This license is issued strictly for the
protection of the particular business or residence. 270 The same
statute explains that the approved use of the handgun is limited to
that particular location for which the license has been issued and
that the handgun may be possessed only on the premises.
2 71
Applying the reasonable regulation balancing test to this license
requirement, the city's interest is clearly public safety. The city
furthers this interest only by requiring individuals to obtain a
license for handguns.2 7 2 This licensing requirement does not
restrict the individual's exercise of his right of self-defense; it
265. CHI., ILL., CODE § 8-20-010 (2008).
266. Id.
267. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817.
268. N.Y. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (protecting only the right to maintain and
regulate a state militia).
269. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., RULES OF NEW YORK 38 § 5-01 (2007).
270. Id. § 5-23(a).
271. Id. § 5-23(a)(1)-(2).
272. See id. § 5-23.
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allows an individual to possess a handgun at his home or place of
business without any restrictions on such possession through
particular safety devices. 273 New York City's handgun licensing
scheme will likely survive constitutional scrutiny.
Like New Orleans, New York City also has statutes that restrict
the use of firearms within the city. In particular, New York has
established strict regulations regarding activities that may be
carried out on city property; such regulations are not limited to
firearms, but include motor vehicles, animals, and posting of
signs.274 Specifically, one statute allows the use or carrying of
handggs on city property only if those handguns have a valid hunt
tag. While this statute does restrict an individual's possession of
firearms, the city has a strong interest in public safety on its own
property that justifies the infringement of the individual right to
possess firearms. Furthermore, this statute appears to fall into the
"sensitive area" categorical exception to the individual right to
keep and bear arms endorsed by Heller. Once again, this New
York regulation seems to pass constitutional scrutiny.
After applying the proposed reasonable regulation balancing
test, it is apparent that most gun regulations will pass constitutional
scrutiny in the wake of Heller.2 76 State gun regulations appear to
be most resilient in the face of constitutional challenge because
they impose only minimal licensing requirements that do not affect
the way an individual can use his firearm or traditional prohibitions
on gun possession that were approved in Heller. On the other hand,
city regulations, especially in urban areas like Chicago, are more
likely to fall to constitutional challenges because they impose more
stringent restrictions on the manner in which a firearm can be used.
VI. CONCLUSION
Heller held that the Second Amendment protects an individual
right to keep and bear arms. This interpretation of the Second
Amendment invalidated a series of District of Columbia statutes
prohibiting the use of handguns and requiring firearms to be kept
essentially inoperable within the home. As a result, Heller
promises to have a dramatic impact on the gun regulations of many
cities throughout America. In order to determine the
constitutionality of state and city gun regulations, courts should use
the reasonableness review of intermediate scrutiny to achieve the
273. Id.
274. Id. § 16-17(b).
275. Id.
276. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816-17 (2008).
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proper balance between the government's interests in public safety
and crime prevention and the individual right to keep and bear
arms for self-defense. This balancing approach will likely uphold
the constitutionality of most existing gun regulations while
invalidating those firearm regulations that do not provide for a self-
defense exception.
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